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ABSTRACT 
This paper reports two new empirical regularities relating to industry concentration. 
First, concentration levels closely correlate in related industries. Second, the correlation 
is moderated by the degree of relatedness between the industries. These regularities are 
derived from the Trinet database, using a survivor-based measure of relatedness. We 
argue that these previously overlooked relations may be explained in terms of 1) 
“spillover effects” between industries and 2) lifecycle factors.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Industries have neighbors, that is, other industries that are closely related to the focal industry. 
The relation between the structural characteristics of such neighbor or related industries, as well 
as the implications of this for firm behavior, has not been offered much attention in industrial 
economics and strategic management.1 For example, in investigating entry behavior, industrial 
economists have generally abstracted from how the industry affiliation of the potential entrant 
may influence its competitive behavior and chances of successful entry. 
 In this paper we report two hitherto neglected empirical regularities concerning the 
relations between the structural characteristics of industries, specifically concentration levels. 
First, we find that concentration correlates on a surprisingly high level ( > .20) across related 
industries, and, secondly, that the strength of the correlation depends on the relatedness of the 
industries.   
 The discovery of empirical regularities emerges from a context of discovery (Popper, 
1934). In our case, the relevant context is the following two stylized facts (Helfat, 2007). First, 
an important finding from the strategy and industrial organization literatures is that firms’ 
diversification behaviors display a systematic preference for closely related industries (Lemelin, 
1982; Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991; Montgomery and Hariharan, 1991; Silverman, 1999).2 
Second, industry affiliation matters to the success of entry, and therefore also for the evolution of 
the structure of the target industry. Thus, another important finding from research in strategy and 
                                                 
1  A partial exception is constituted by work on multipoint competition (Edwards, 1955; Bulow et al., 1985; Karnani 
and Wernerfelt, 1985; Gimeno, 1999; Gimeno & Woo, 1999). 
2 Note that the findings regarding relatedness and the direction of diversification are much more robust and stable 
than the findings regarding the link between relatedness and corporate performance (e.g., Montgomery & Hariharan, 
1991; Silverman, 1999). 
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industrial organization is that diversifying entrants are more likely to survive and grow than 
newborn entrants (i.e., entrants without industry affiliation) (Baldwin, 1995; Dunne, Roberts, & 
Samuelson, 1989; Siegfried & Evans, 1994; Geroski, 1995; Sharma & Kesner, 1996).  
 Combining these two stylized facts implies that diversifying entrants pose a bigger threat 
for incumbents in terms of loss of market share and intensified rivalry than newborn entrants 
(ceteris paribus). This suggests that relations between neighboring industries matter to entry 
behavior and to ex post competition.  This may show up in the data as statistical relations among 
the key structural characteristics of neighboring industries. A natural place to start empirical 
inquiry into such issues is to investigate industry concentration, because of its status as the 
perhaps key structural industry characteristic in the strategic management and industrial 
organization literatures. Such reasoning led to the finding of the two regularities reported in this 
paper. 
 The regularities are derived from the AGSM/Trinet database which is a database covering 
the entire US economy in the 1980s, offering biannual data on the establishment level. We find 
that a large portion of the variance in industry concentration can in fact be explained by the 
concentration that characterizes related industries and the degree of relatedness between the focal 
industry and its neighbors. We briefly develop a set of possible explanations of these regularities; 
however, the data set does not allow us to directly test such explanations.  
 In sum, the contribution of this paper is to report two new regularities between industry 
concentration levels, and offer possible theoretical explanations of the regularities. To our 
knowledge, this has not been done previously in the industrial economics or strategic 
management literatures. 
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A SURVIVOR-BASED APPROACH  
Empirically examining correlations between structural characteristics of industries raises huge 
problems that have to do with separating the relevant from the irrelevant industries.  In other 
words, which industries are likely to influence each other in terms of structural characteristics? 
As suggested, existing empirical findings provide clues here, particularly the finding that firms 
prefer to diversify into related industries (e.g., Montgomery & Hariharan, 1991). This leads to 
the prediction that industries differ with respect to the impact on concentration from diversifying 
entry and that this difference may be explained in terms of relatedness. The problem is, however, 
that the conventional procedures for measuring the relatedness between industries are too coarse: 
Using distances within the SIC-hierarchy leaves one with only three levels of distance, for 
example, different 4-digit but identical 3-digit industry, different 3-digit but identical 2-digit 
industry, different 2-digit industries. This would not allow us to identify which industries are 
closest, and certainly not variation in the distance to those designated as the closest neighbors (all 
industries would have a large amount of equally close neighbors). In other words, a different and 
preferably continuous measure of relatedness is called for.  
A survivor-based measure of relatedness is a candidate for such a measure. This measure 
means that relatedness is determined by how often a given pair of industries is actually combined 
within a firm, compared to what one would expect if diversification patterns were random (Lien 
& Klein, 2004; Teece et al., 1994). A pair of industries are related to the degree that this 
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difference is positive and unrelated to the degree that it is negative). The measure thus produces 
a continuous survivor-based metric of the relatedness between all industries in the economy.  
The term “survivor-based” refers to the fact that the measure is based on observing the 
outcome of decisions by those with superior knowledge, namely local descionmakers, and the 
screening of those decisions by the competitive process. In other words, the measure picks up 
whatever matters for decision makers as well as the viability of a combination of industries. This 
means that we are agnostic about what drives relatedness for a particular combination of 
industries, which constitutes both a strength and a weakness. The strength is that it allows the 
causes of relatedness to vary across situations. It does not involve singling out any particular 
class of assets, for example, customer related assets, technological assets or production assets (or 
some combination of these) (Farjoun, 1994; Montgomery & Hariharan, 1991; Silverman, 1999) 
as the universal source of economies of scope or complementarity. Rather, this may vary from 
case to case. The main weakness is, of course, that the measure may be noisy due to 
contamination from motives and mechanisms unrelated to relatedness, such as herd-behavior or 
empire-building. However, attempts to validate the survivor based measure have shown it to 
consistently and significantly outperform SIC-based measures (references withheld).   
Calculating a Survivor-based Measure 
Our technical approach is based on a procedure developed by Teece et al. (1994). Let K be the 
universe of diversified firms, and I be the universe of industries these firms are active in. Let Cik 
= 1 if firm k is active in industry i. The number of diversified firms present in industry i is then ni 
= ΣkCik. Let Jij be the number of diversified firms participating in both industries i and j, such 
that Jij = Σk CikCjk. Jij will be larger if industries i and j are related, but is also increasing with ni 
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and nj. To remove the effect of the size of industries i and j, the number Jij is compared with the 
expected number of combinations if diversification patterns were random. 
To calculate the expected number of combinations we consider a hyper-geometric situation 
where a sample of size ni is drawn without replacement from a population of K firms. Those 
chosen are considered active in industry i. A second independent sample of size nj is then drawn 
from the population the population of K firms. Those chosen are considered active in industry j. 
The number xij of firms active in both i and j is then a hypergeometric random variable with 
population K, special members ni and sample size nj. The distribution function for this variable 
is:  
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The expected number of combinations under random diversification is μij, and we can now 
construct a standardized measure of the difference between actual and expected combinations in 
the following way:  
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Given this basic measure of the relatedness between a pair of businesses, it is possible to 
rank, for any industry, how close all other industries are, and it is possible to calculate aggregate 
measures of how close, say, the four closest industries are to a given industry.  
To calculate SRij we used the AGSM/Trinet Large Establishment Database (Trinet). The 
Trinet database covers the 1980s, containing biannual records of all US establishments with 
more than 20 employees, including variables such as 4-digit SIC code, corporate ownership, and 
sales.3 The primary measure of SRij is calculated from the Trinet files of 1981, 1983, 1985 and 
1987 using all recorded firms active in two or more 4-digit SIC codes as a basis.  
Aggregation of Variables  
To understand how industry concentration in one industry is influenced by concentration in 
neighboring industries, it is necessary to derive summary measures that aggregate variables over 
all industries close enough to matter. It is not sufficient to merely focus on the closest neighbor, 
since, for example, if the closest industry is concentrated, there can be a second and third 
industry almost equally close that are fragmented. A decision concerning how many industries 
we should sum over is required. In order to determine what a reasonable cut-off point might be, 
we resort to the following simple procedure: We use the concentration ratio, measured as the C4 
ratio of the focal industry as the dependent variable, and then introduce the concentration ratio in 
the closest- , second closest -, third closest - (and so on) industry as independent variables. Table 
1 provides the regression output for 1981. As can be inferred from the Table, the concentration 
ratios of the four closest industries are all significant predictors of concentration in the focal 
                                                 
3 The Trinet database contains an unknown proportion of sales figures that are imputed from multiplying employee 
counts with average industry sales per employee. To examine whether this constitutes a substantial source of error 
for our sample, we correlated the sales data from Trinet with Compustat data. This resulted in a correlation of 0,893 
which indicates that the sales data in Trinet are of acceptable quality. 
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industry, while the fifth closest industry is not. We therefore use the four closest industries as the 
basis for computing aggregated variables. 
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ 
Insert Table 1 here 
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ 
We measure the concentration of neighbouring industries in two different ways. One measure 
is the sum of the C4 ratios of the four closest industries (C4Neighbors). The other, 
complementary, measure is the number of potential diversifying entrants from the closest 
neighboring industries. We calculate this as the number of firms in the neighboring industry, 
minus the number of firms already combining the two industries. Summing this over the four 
closest industries we obtain a measure of the size of the pool of diversifying entrants from these 
industries (Entrypool). The reason for including both is that the C4 measure alone is insensitive 
to the structure of the smaller firms in an industry. For example, a C4 ratio of 0.80 does not 
reveal whether the remaining 20% is divided between 2 or 50 firms. For our purposes this is 
possibly important, since these smaller firms represent potential diversifying entrants.  
Above, we described our procedure for calculating the fundamental measure of SRij. The 
variable Relatedness is the simple sum of SRij for the four closest industries. The purpose of this 
variable is twofold. First, it serves to identify neighbor industries. Second, it is used to examine 
the moderation effect of relatedness on the strength of the correlation between concentration 
levels across industries. 
The interaction variable is measured in two different ways. The first one multiplies 
C4Neighbors and Relatedness, and is termed C4XRelatedness. The second uses the size of the 
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entry pool instead of the C4 ratio and is created by multiplying Entrypool and Relatedness  This 
term, PoolXRelatedness, should have the opposite sign of C4XRelatedness. 
Finally, the dependent variable (Industry concentration) is the C4-ratio of the focal 
industry.  
We use a sample from the Trinet database to examine the relationship between these 
variables. The sample is essentially population data for all 4-digit SIC industries in 1981, 1983, 
1985 and 1987. The only industries excluded are nonprofit industries, and industries that do not 
have relationships to at least four other industries. This means that for example industries that 
have no diversified firms are excluded.4 This produces a sample size of 855 industries in 1981, 
845 industries in 1983, 847 industries in 1985, and 837 industries in 1987.   
 We do not report the mean, standard deviation and correlations for all years, but Table 2 
provides data for 1981 as a representative example.    
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ 
Insert Table 2 here 
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ 
 
MODELS AND RESULTS 
To examine our data for empirical regularities we apply OLS regression. The first set of 
regressions are provided in Model 1 and Model 2 of Table 3.  These regressions are designed to 
examine the direct (umoderated) effect of concentration in neighboring industries on a focal 
industry. In Model 1 we only include the variable Entrypool and a constant term. It seems 
                                                 
4 Note that the presence of one diversified firm is sufficient for an industry to be included, provided that this one 
firm is also active in four other industries. 
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reasonable to expect the coefficient on Entrypool to be negatively signed, since a large pool of 
potential diversifying entrants is more likely to increase concentration than reduce it. As the 
results in Model 1 shows, our data confirm this expectation. In all four years the coefficient is 
negative and significant. In terms of effect size, the standardized coefficients show that one 
standard deviation increase in Entrypool leads to between 0,21 and 0,27 standard deviations 
reduced concentration. Model 2 adds the other concentration measure C4Neighbors to the model. 
If Entrypool is negatively signed, one would expect would C4Neighbors to be positively signed. 
As model 2 shows the coefficient on C4Neighbors is indeed positively signed and significant in 
all years. In terms of effect size, the standardized coefficients show that one standard deviation 
increase in C4Neighbors leads to between 0,32 and 0,43 standard deviations increased 
concentration. Note also that the coefficients on Entrypool are reduced in size, but remain 
significant in all years except 1987. Apparently these two measures are somewhat 
complementary, but they obviously overlap significantly. Among the two, C4Neighbors is 
clearly the better measure in terms of explaining concentration. The adjusted R2 for model 2 
ranges between 0,13 and 0,19 indicating that the structure of neighboring industries is a 
significant determinant of industry structure.  
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ 
Insert Table 3 here 
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ 
 Table 4 examines how the degree of relatedness moderates the correlation between 
concentration levels. Table 4 contains two models. Model 3 adds the interaction term 
PoolXRelatedness to model 1, and Model 4 adds the interaction term C4XRelatedness to model 
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2. Generally, it seems reasonable to expect relatedness to strengthen the effects in Model 1 and 
Model 2. I.e., if increasing the pool of potential entrants from related industries reduces 
concentration, one would expect the reduction to be stronger the shorter the distance such 
entrants have to “jump”. In terms of model 3 this would imply a negative coefficient on the 
interaction variable PoolXRelatedness. The data support this. The coefficient is indeed negative 
and highly significant in all four years. It is also notable that the model with the interaction term 
(Model 3) performs significantly  better than the model without it (Model 1) in all four years 
(p<0,001). For Model 4 the same logic implies a positive coefficient on the interaction variable 
C4XRelatedness. Again, we find that the variable is signed as expected and significant all four 
years, and also that the model with the interaction term (Model 4) performs significantly better 
than the model without it (Model2). There seems to be a The best model in terms of adjusted R2 
is model 4, ranging from 0,14 to 0,21.  
 So far we have found systematic evidence that concentration correlates quite strongly 
across related industries, and that this correlation is moderated by the degree of relatedness. We 
have not offered explanations for why this may be the case. We now move on to discuss possible 
explanations for these empirical regularities. 
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ 
Insert Table 4 here 
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ 
DISCUSSION 
The structural characteristics of industries have long been central in strategic management and 
industrial organization research. Although the research emphasis in industrial organization 
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research has changed towards modeling structural characteristics as endogenous outcomes of 
strategic interaction (rather than taking them as exogenous variables), structural characteristics 
still play a key role as constraints on the equilibria that can be reached in a game. Similarly, 
strategic management research continues to make use of variables that capture structural effects 
as key independent variables in theoretical and empirical research (e.g., Sharma and Kesner, 
1996; Gimeno, 1999). Arguably, the key structural variable remains that of industry 
concentration. However, in decades of research that has investigated the determinants and effects 
of concentration, no research has (to our knowledge) examined how concentration in one 
industry may influence concentration in another industry and what may moderate this. This is 
exactly where we contribute by reporting the above regularities.  
Why Concentration Levels Correlate 
A number of possible theoretical explanations exist that may account for the regularities reported 
here. The limitations of the data set mean that we cannot test these. However, we briefly outline 
these explanations in order to stimulate further research. 
Consider the first reported regularity, namely that the level of concentration in an industry 
correlates positively with the level of concentration in its closest neighboring industries. There 
are three mechanisms that may (jointly, pair wise, or in isolation) establish such a correlation. 
 First, if the industries close to the focal industry are concentrated, there is a smaller pool of 
potential diversifying entrants (ceteris paribus). In other words, the threat of direct entry is 
smaller. This weakens an important mechanism that may otherwise contribute to reducing 
concentration. Second, concentrated neighboring industries are themselves likely to be difficult 
to enter. This reduces the number of entrants that can enter the focal industry indirectly, that is, 
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using neighboring industries as stepping stones.5 Third, high levels of economies of scope 
between neighboring industries can create an entry barrier that is shared between the industries, 
facilitating concentration in both the focal industry and its neighboring industries.  
These effects of these mechanisms may be reinforced by industry life cycle effects. Work 
on industry life cycles (e.g., Klepper & Graddy, 1990) typically stress that nascent industries 
tend to be competitive and have relatively low entry barriers. However, industry evolution which 
is driven by technological development tends to be accompanied by a shake-out that increases 
concentration. To the extent that related industries make use of similar technology, they are 
likely to be at the same stages of their life-cycles, and are therefore likely to have similar same 
levels of concentration. While this argument would conceivably apply to entirely specialized 
firms in separate industries (thus offsetting the above mechanisms), we think it is more likely to 
reinforce the above mechanisms. Thus, industries that are related in terms of technology are also 
likely to exhibit economies of scope and resource complementarities (Teece, 1980; Teece et al., 
1994). Such economies are often seen as important antecedents of diversification. Consequently, 
diversification that stems from similar technology across industries is likely to be captured by 
our survivor-based measure of relatedness.  
The Moderating Effect of Relatedness 
Consider also the second regularity, namely that the correlation between the levels of 
concentration in neighboring industries is positively moderated by their degree of relatedness.  
There are (at least) three mechanisms that may produce this regularity. First, relatedness impacts 
the entry decision (Penrose, 1959): The less related a potential target industry is, the less 
                                                 
5  Analogous to the way in which firms may use strategic groups within industries as stepping stones to the strategic 
group the ultimately prefer to stay within (Caves & Porter, 1977). 
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attractive it is for a potential entrant. Second, entry barriers based on economies of scope may 
play a role: The less related an industry is, the less the relevant economies of scope, and the less 
important it is to be active in both to be competitive in either. Third, again a life cycle argument 
may be relevant: If industries are related they are also likely to make use of similar technology, 
to be at a similar point of their evolution, and therefore to have similar levels of concentration.  
Relevance 
The findings and arguments in this paper contribute to the empirical industrial organization 
literature. Moreover, our arguments and findings hold implications for the strategic management 
literature, particularly the diversification literature. For example, consider the debate on 
diversification and performance (beginning with Rumelt, 1974; Bettis, 1981; Christensen & 
Montgomery, 1981; Rumelt, 1982). In their critique of Rumelt (1974) Christensen and 
Montgomery (1981) argued that the relatedness/performance link in (an updated version of) 
Rumelt’s sample was strongly influenced by industry characteristics: Controlling for such 
characteristics largely eliminated Rumelt’s (1974) finding of a positive relatedness/performance 
link. However, this line of argument takes industry characteristics as exogenously given, whereas 
we have suggested that one such characteristic (i.e., concentration) as endogenous to 
diversification decisions. This paper thus suggests that using industry concentration (and 
possibly also other industry characteristics) as a control in relatedness/performance studies is a 
possible source of bias, since the findings reported here are consistent with the notion that 
concentration is to a considerable extent an outcome of relatedness and diversification decisions.  
 Although industry concentration may be partly endogenous to firm actions, it is still a 
variable that is highly relevant to practicing strategists. First, these ideas allow strategists to 
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include variables that are relevant to assessing entry threats, namely the degrees of concentration 
of neighboring industries and the role that relatedness plays in influencing this threat.  Second, 
strategists can use the ideas in this paper to structure thinking about how entry threats evolve as a 
function of changing degrees of concentration and relatedness. For example, a technological 
change that works to fragment a neighboring industry will tend to reduce concentration levels in 
the focal industry. How much, depends not only on how much the neighboring industry is 
fragmented, but also on how closely related the two industries are. A second example is a 
technological change that increases the relatedness to a neighboring industry. The effect of such 
a change will depend on the structure of this industry. If the industry in question is sufficiently 
fragmented, it will reduce concentration in the focal industry, while if it is sufficiently 
concentrated the opposite will occur.     
Future Work 
Future work on these issues may proceed in a number of directions. First, more empirical work 
on different data is needed to establish our findings as true “stylized facts,” that is, regularities 
that appear in so many contexts that they may be considered empirical truths (Helfat, 2007: 187).  
Thus, we have only examined US data for the 1980s.  
Second, the theoretical mechanisms we have proposed as candidates for explaining the 
regularities need to be subject to empirical testing. This requires more fine-grained data than we 
have had access to.  
Third, the theoretical mechanisms need to be formally modeled in a multi-period setting. 
For example, we have posited that diversifying entrants are the most dangerous species of 
entrants in terms of driving down concentration. While this may be true in an initial stage of a 
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multi-period game, concentration may increase in later stages. Concentration may be high in an 
industry because incumbents are highly efficient (Demsetz, 1973); when such firms enter a 
neighboring industry, they initially drive down concentration, but may later use their strengths to 
significantly take away market share from weaker incumbents of the industry, effectively 
increasing concentration. A further issue that needs to be theoretically as well empirically 
examined concerns the mode of entry, that is, do entrants enter by means of mergers and 
acquisitions or de novo entry. Consistent with the industrial economics literature and because of 
the constraints imposed by the dataset, we have not treated acquisitions as entry in this paper; 
however, it is obvious that for strategists considering an entry decision, the choice of entry mode 
is a pressing one. From the theory perspective, entry mode choices may affect, for example, the 
level of sunk cost commitment and therefore the form that ex post competition takes, and, in 
turn, the evolution of industry concentration.  
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Table 1: OLS Regression of concentration (C4) within an industry by concentration (C4) in neighboring industries, 1981 (N = 855) 
 
 Unstandardized 
Coefficient (S.E) 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
t-statistics 
Constant 11,371***  (2,029)  5,605 
C4 closest   0,210***  (0,032)   0,217 6,607 
C4 2nd closest   0,155***  (0,031)   0,164 4,998 
C4 3rd closest   0,163***  (0,033)   0,159 4,992 
C4 4th closest   0,152***  (0,032)   0,152 4,752 
C4 5th closest -0,002        (0,031) -0,002 0,073 
 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
 
Table 2: Means, standard deviations and correlation coefficients of independent variables, 1981 (N = 855) 
 
 Mean SD C4Neighbors Entrypool Relatedness C4XRelatedness 
C4Neighbors 139,40 56,00 1    
Entrypool 295,32 338,81 -0,347*** 1   
Relatedness   82,78 39,54   0,150*** -0,244*** 1  
C4XRelatedness 11591,9 7960,4   0,665*** -0,322*** 0,760*** 1 
PoolXRelatedness 22140,1 24716,2 -0,318***   0,609*** 0,234*** -0,088** 
 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
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Table 3: OLS Regression of concentration (C4) within an industry by concentration in neighboring industries (N = 855,845, 847, 837) 
   1981 1983 1985 19876 
 
 
Model 1 
Constant  39,54*** 
(1,028) 
39,36*** 
(1,09) 
41,76*** 
(1,15) 
0,59*** 
(0,1) 
 
Entrypool 
Unstandardized 
coeff. (S.E.) 
-0,015*** 
(0,002) 
-0,015*** 
(0,002) 
-0,020*** 
(0,003) 
-0,000*** 
(0,000) 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
-0,224*** -0,212*** -0,236*** -0,274*** 
Model 1 
Adjusted R2 
 0,049 0,044 0,054 0,074 
 
 
 
 
Model 2 
Constant  14,88*** 
(2,38) 
17,32*** 
(2,47) 
14,63*** 
(2,03) 
0,19*** 
(0,04) 
 
Entrypool 
Unstandardized 
coeff. (S.E.) 
-0,006** 
(0,002) 
-0,006* 
(0,002) 
-0,007* 
(0,003) 
0,000 
(0,000) 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
-0,089** -0,080* -0,082* 0,001 
 
C4Neighbors 
Unstandardized 
coeff. (S.E.) 
0,158*** 
(0,014) 
0,141*** 
(0,014) 
0,133*** 
(0,015) 
0,163*** 
(0,015) 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
0,378*** 0,339*** 0,318*** 0,435*** 
Model 2 
Adjusted R2 
 0,173 0,141 0,131 0,187 
 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
                                                 
6 Note that the SIC-system was revised in 1987 which affected about 30% of the relevant industries. Some industry definitions were widened, and some narrowed. This 
means caution is needed when comparing 1987 figures to the other years. 
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Table 4: OLS Regression of concentration (C4) within an industry by concentration-, relatedness- and interaction between concentration 
and relatedness in neighboring industries (N = 855,845, 847, 837) 
 
 
   1981 1983 1985 19877 
 
 
Model 3 
Constant Unstandardized 
Coefficient (S.E.) 
31,88*** (2,20) 32,75*** (2,44) 35,81*** (2,56) 0,61*** (0,026) 
 
Entrypool 
Unstandardized 
coefficient (S.E.) 
0,002  (0,004) 0,004 (0,005) -0,003 (0,006) 0,000 (0,000) 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
0,023 0,049 -0,033 0,008 
 
Relatedness 
Unstandardized 
coefficient (S.E.) 
0,102*** (0,024) 0,080*** (0,025) 0,072** (0,027) 0,000 (0,000) 
Standardized 
coefficient 
0,174*** 0,145*** 0,127** 0,001 
 
PoolXRelatednes 
Unstandardized 
coefficient (S.E.) 
-0,000*** (0,000) -0,000*** (0,000) -0,000*** (0,000) -0,000*** (0,000) 
Standardized 
coefficient 
-0,280*** -0,300*** -0,241*** -0,387*** 
Model 3 
Adjusted R2 
 0,073 0,059 0,065 0,142 
 
 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Note that the SIC-system was revised in 1987 which affected about 30% of the relevant industries. .  Some industry definitions were widened, and some narrowed. This 
means caution is needed when comparing 1987 figures to the other years. 
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Table 4 (cont.) 
 
   1981 1983 1985 1987 
 
 
Model 4 
Constant  Unstandardized 
Coefficient (S.E.) 
27,02***  
(5,01) 
30,18***  
(4,87) 
25,47*** 
(5,31) 
0,492*** 
(0,08) 
 
Entrypool 
Unstandardized 
coefficient (S.E.) 
-0,005* 
(0,002) 
-0,005* 
(0,002) 
-0,006 
0,003) 
-0,000 
(0,000) 
Standardized 
coefficient 
-0,081* -0,074* -0,069 -0,067 
 
C4Neighbors 
Unstandardized 
coefficient (S.E.) 
0,042  
(0,032) 
0,031 
0,031) 
0,069* 
(0,032) 
0,050 
(0,032) 
Standardized 
coefficient 
0,101 0,074 0,165* 0,132 
 
Relatedness 
Unstandardized 
coefficient (S.E.) 
-0,141* * 
(0,050) 
-0,145** 
(0,046) 
-0,086 
(0,052) 
-0,003*** 
(0,001) 
Standardized 
coefficient 
-0,239** -0,263** -0,152 -0,495*** 
C4XRelatednes Unstandardized 
coefficient (S.E.) 
0,001***  
(0,000) 
0,001***  
(0,000) 
0,001*  
(0,000) 
0,003*** 
(0,001) 
Standardized 
coefficient 
0,451*** 0,427*** 0,267* 0,447*** 
Model 3 
Adjusted R2 
 0,195 0,157 0,137 0,207 
 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
